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Fundamental Rate Limits of Physical Layer
Spoofing
Jie Xu, Lingjie Duan, and Rui Zhang
Abstract—This letter studies an emerging wireless communica-
tion intervention problem at the physical layer, where a legitimate
spoofer aims to spoof a malicious link from Alice to Bob, by
replacing Alice’s transmitted source message with its target
message at Bob side. From an information-theoretic perspective,
we are interested in characterizing the maximum achievable
spoofing rate of this new spoofing channel, which is equivalent
to the maximum achievable rate of the target message at Bob,
under the condition that Bob cannot decode the source message
from Alice. We propose a novel combined spoofing approach,
where the spoofer sends its own target message, combined with
a processed version of the source message to cancel the source
message at Bob. For both cases when Bob treats interference as
noise (TIN) or applies successive interference cancelation (SIC),
we obtain the maximum achievable spoofing rates by optimizing
the power allocation between the target and source messages at
the spoofer.
Index Terms—Wireless communication intervention, physical
layer spoofing, achievable spoofing rate, power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of infrastructure-free wireless communi-
cations (e.g., mobile ad hoc networks and unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) communications) imposes new challenges on
the public security, since they may be misused by malicious
users to commit crimes or even terror attacks [1]. To overcome
this issue, authorized parties can launch legitimate information
eavesdropping (see, e.g., [2]–[5]) and jamming (see, e.g.,
[6]–[9]) on suspicious and malicious wireless communication
links, so as to monitor and intervene in them for the purpose
of detecting and preventing security attacks [1].
We focus on the emerging wireless communication inter-
vention at the physical layer. Different from the jamming
intervention that can only disrupt or disable target links, we
propose a new intervention via physical layer spoofing to
change the communicated information over malicious links
while keeping their operation. Such a physical layer spoofing
has been first investigated in our previous work [10] by
considering a three-node spoofing channel (see Fig. 1), where
a legitimate spoofer aims to spoof an ongoing malicious link
from Alice to Bob, by replacing Alice’s transmitted source
message with its target message at Bob side. We have proposed
a symbol-level spoofing approach in [10] for the spoofer to
minimize the spoofing-symbol-error-rate of the target message
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Fig. 1. A three-node spoofing channel, where a legitimate spoofer aims to
change the communicated information from Alice to Bob.
at Bob under practical phase-shift keying modulations. Never-
theless, the fundamental information-theoretic limits of such
a new spoofing channel remain unaddressed, thus motivating
our study in this work.
In this letter, we are interested in characterizing the maxi-
mum achievable spoofing rate of the spoofing channel in Fig.
1, which is equivalent to the maximum achievable rate of the
target message at Bob, while ensuring that Bob cannot decode
the source message. We propose a new combined spoofing
approach, where the spoofer sends its own target message,
combined with a processed version of the source message
to cancel it at Bob. In particular, we assume Alice transmits
with a constant rate, and consider two cases when Bob treats
interference as noise (TIN) and applies successive interference
cancelation (SIC), respectively. To successfully spoof in the
former case, the spoofer should make the received target
message at Bob be stronger than the source message; and in the
latter case, the spoofer should make the maximum achievable
rate of the source message (under different decoding orders)
be strictly smaller than Alice’s communication rate. In both
cases, we obtain the maximum achievable spoofing rates by
optimizing the power allocation between the target and source
messages at the spoofer. Numerical results show that our
proposed combined spoofing approach with optimized power
allocation outperforms other benchmark spoofing schemes.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a three-node spoofing chan-
nel, where two malicious users Alice and Bob communicate
to plan or commit crimes, and a legitimate spoofer aims to
change the communicated data from Alice to Bob to defend
against them. Practically, the malicious users can be identified
a priori via, e.g., legitimate information eavesdropping [2]–
[5]. We define h and g as the complex channel coefficients
of the malicious link from Alice to Bob and the spoofing link
from the spoofer to Bob, respectively.
First, we consider the case without spoofing. Let s denote
the source message transmitted by Alice with unit power. The
received signal by Bob is given by
y = h
√
Ps+ n, (1)
where P denotes the constant transmit power of Alice, and n
denotes the receiver noise at Bob being a circularly symmetric
2complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variable with zero mean
and unit variance. The capacity of the malicious link is given
as C , log2(1 + |h|2P ), which is achieved when Alice
employs Gaussian signaling (i.e., setting s as a CSCG random
variable with zero mean and unit variance). Suppose that Alice
communicates with Bob with a constant communication rate
R no greater than the channel capacity C, i.e., R ≤ C, where
R is chosen based on the quality of service (QoS) requirement.
Next, we consider the case with spoofing. The spoofer
aims to change Bob’s decoded message from Alice’s source
message s to its desired target message. It is assumed that the
spoofer has the perfect information of the source message s
and the channel coefficients h and g. This assumption is made
to help derive the spoofing rate upper bound, similar to that in
the prior works in the information-theoretic literature (see, e.g.,
the correlated jamming in [8] and the cognitive radio channel
in [11]).1 In this case, the spoofer can use the same codebook
of s for sending the target message, such that Bob will decode
the target message without awareness of being spoofed. Let
x denote the target message with unit power, which is in
general independent of s. We consider a combined spoofing
approach, where the spoofer designs its spoofing signal z to
be a combined version of both the source message s and the
target message x with proper processing. Particularly, we have
z = αs + βx, where α and β denote the complex transmit
coefficients for the messages s and x, respectively. In this
case, the received signal y at Bob can be expressed as
y = h
√
Ps+ gz + n =
(
h
√
P + gα
)
s+ gβx+ n. (2)
By denoting Q as the maximum spoofing power at the spoofer,
then we have
|α|2 + |β|2 ≤ Q. (3)
In order to successfully spoof the malicious communica-
tion, the spoofer should design the spoofing signal (i.e., the
transmit coefficients α and β) such that Bob is only able to
successfully decode the target message x but fails to decode
the source message s. In this case, the successful spoofing
critically depends on the decoding method employed by Bob.
We consider two typical Bob receivers as follows, including
the practical TIN receiver and the information-theoretically
optimal SIC receiver. It is assumed that the spoofer is aware
of which receiver being employed by Bob.
1) TIN receiver at Bob: Bob does not know the coexistence
of the two messages s and x, and thus considers the stronger
one between them to be its desired signal, and treats the other
one (the co-channel interference) to be noise. In this case, the
received message x at Bob should have a stronger power than
s such that the spoofing is successful.
2) SIC receiver at Bob: Bob is able to detect the coex-
istence of s and x, and accordingly attempts to use SIC to
decode both of them. From the successfully decoded ones
(if any), Bob will decide which the desired message is. In
particular, Bob first decodes one message (x or s) by treating
1Though beyond the scope of this letter, please refer to [10] for a detailed
example for the spoofer to practically obtain s, h and g, and synchronize with
Alice and Bob, where the spoofer can act as a fake relay in the malicious
network in obtaining such information. Furthermore, the spoofer can work in
a full-duplex mode (e.g., amplify and forward) to obtain s via eavesdropping
from Alice and at the same time spoof Bob.
the other as noise, and then cancels it from the received
message y to decode the other one. Generally speaking, Bob
can use two different decoding orders (first x and then s, or
first s and then x).
Under both receiver cases, we aim to characterize the
maximum achievable spoofing rates of the target message x,
provided that Bob cannot decode the source message s.2
III. SPOOFING TIN RECEIVER AT BOB
A. Problem Formulation for TIN Receiver
When Bob employs the TIN receiver, the spoofer can
successfully spoof the malicious communication link only
when the received power of the target message x is greater
than that of the source message s. Mathematically, it must
hold that |gβ|2 > |h
√
P +gα|2. Note that this strict inequality
constraint may make the associated optimization problem ill-
posed: an optimizer on the boundary of the feasible region
may not be attainable. To address this issue, we revise it to
be a non-strict inequality constraint as
|gβ|2 ≥ |h
√
P + gα|2 + δ1, (4)
where δ1 > 0 is a sufficiently small positive constant.
In this case, the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise-
ratio (SINR) for the target message x at Bob is γ(α, β) =
|gβ|2
|h
√
P+gα|2+1 . Accordingly, the achievable spoofing rate (in
bps/Hz) is expressed as follows by assuming x is CSCG and
s is also CSCG as the “worst-case” noise.
r(α, β) = log2
(
1 +
|gβ|2
|h√P + gα|2 + 1
)
. (5)
As a result, the achievable spoofing rate maximization problem
is formulated as
(P1) : max
α,β
r(α, β)
s.t. (3) and (4).
B. Optimal Spoofing Solution to Problem (P1)
First, we reformulate (P1) as an equivalent problem with a
single real decision variable. It is evident that the optimality
of (P1) is attained when the processed source message s from
the spoofer is destructively combined at Bob with that from
Alice, and the sum-power constraint in (3) is tight. In other
words, we have
α =− hg
∗
|h||g| α˜, (6)
β =
√
Q− |α˜|2, (7)
where the superscript ∗ denotes the conjugate operation, and
α˜ ≥ 0 denotes the magnitude of α. Here, since both the
objective function and constraints of (P1) are irrespective of
the phase of β, in (7) we decide β to be a real variable without
loss of optimality. Therefore, (P1) is equivalently reformulated
as follows to optimize an SINR function γ˜(α˜) with only a real
decision variable α˜.
(P1.1) : max
α˜≥0
γ˜(α˜) ,
|g|2(Q− α˜2)
(|h|
√
P − |g|α˜)2 + 1
s.t. 2|g|2α˜2 − 2|h||g|
√
Pα˜+ |h|2P − |g|2Q+ δ1 ≤ 0. (8)
2In practice, the spoofer can choose any rate (for x) no larger than the
maximum achievable spoofing rate, provided with successful spoofing.
3Next, we check the feasibility of problem (P1.1) (and thus
(P1)).
Lemma 3.1: Problem (P1.1) (and thus (P1)) is feasible if
and only if Q ≥ |h|2P+2δ12|g|2 .
Proof: Note that the constraint in (8) can be rewritten as
2|g|2
(
α˜− |h|
√
P
2|g|
)2
+ |h|
2P
2 −|g|2Q+δ1 ≤ 0, which specifies
a nonempty feasible set if and only if |h|
2P
2 −|g|2Q+ δ1 ≤ 0.
Equivalently, problem (P1.1) is feasible if and only if Q ≥
|h|2P+2δ1
2|g|2 . This proposition thus follows.
Finally, we obtain the optimal solutions to (P1.1) and (P1)
when they are feasible. In this case, the constraint in (8) is
equivalently expressed as
ω ≤ α˜ ≤ ω, (9)
where ω = |h|
√
P−
√
2|g|2Q−|h|2P−2δ1
2|g| and ω =
|h|√P+
√
2|g|2Q−|h|2P−2δ1
2|g| denote the minimum and maximum
values of α˜ for the TIN spoofing to be successful, respectively.
Furthermore, by checking its first-order derivative, we can
show that there exist one local maximum point α˜1 and one
local minimum point α˜2 for the SINR function γ˜(α˜), which
are given by
α˜1 =
|h|2P + |g|2Q+ 1
2|h||g|√P −
√
(|h|2P + |g|2Q+ 1)2 − 4|h|2|g|2PQ
2|h||g|√P
(10)
and α˜2 = |h|
2P+|g|2Q+1
2|h||g|√P +
√
(|h|2P+|g|2Q+1)2−4|h|2|g|2PQ
2|h||g|√P ,
respectively. In particular, γ˜(α˜) is first increasing over α˜ ∈
[0, α˜1], then decreasing over α˜ ∈ (α˜1, α˜2), and finally in-
creasing over α¯ ∈ [α˜2,+∞). Since limα˜→∞ γ˜(α˜) = −1 but
γ˜(α˜) > 0, ∀α˜ ∈ [0, α˜1], it is evident that α˜1 is the globally
optimal point to maximize γ˜(α˜) without any constraints. Then
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1: The optimal solution to (P1.1) is given by
α˜⋆ = max (ω, α˜1) , (11)
and thus the optimal solution to (P1) is α⋆ = − hg∗|h||g| α˜⋆ and
β⋆ =
√
Q− |α⋆|2.
Proof: The optimal solution to (P1.1) can be easily
verified based on the monotonic property of γ˜(α˜) together with
the fact that α˜1 ≤ ω and α˜1 ≤
√
Q. Then, by substituting α˜⋆
in (11) into (6) and (7), the optimal solution to (P1) is derived.
Therefore, this proposition is proved.
IV. SPOOFING SIC RECEIVER AT BOB
A. Problem Formulation for SIC Receiver
When Bob employs the SIC receiver, the spoofer needs to
design its spoofing signal such that Bob is able to decode the
target message x but fails to decode the source message s
for the purpose of successful spoofing. In general, the spoofer
should consider the following two cases, depending on the
decoding orders employed by Bob. Here, Bob can be viewed
as a receiver of a two-user multiple-access channel (MAC) by
considering Alice and the spoofer as the two transmitters.
In the first case, Bob first decodes s by treating x as noise,
and then subtracts s from the received signal y to decode x.
Accordingly, the maximum achievable rates of s and x at the
receiver of Bob (under given α and β) are given as follows
by assuming both s and x are CSCG.
r(I)s = log2
(
1 +
|h√P + gα|2
|gβ|2 + 1
)
, (12)
r(I)x = log2
(
1 + |gβ|2) . (13)
In order to prevent Bob from successfully decoding s, the
spoofer should ensure that its maximum achievable rate is
smaller than Alice’s communication rate, i.e.,
r(I)s < R. (14)
Since Bob fails to decode s, the decoding of x should
suffer from the interference of s, and therefore the achievable
spoofing rate is given as r(α, β) in (5).
In the second case, Bob first decodes x by treating s as
noise, and then cancels x from y to decode s. Accordingly,
the maximum achievable rates of s and x (under given α and
β) at the receiver of Bob are respectively given by
r(II)s = log2
(
1 + |h
√
P + gα|2
)
, (15)
r(II)x = log2
(
1 +
|gβ|2
|h√P + gα|2 + 1
)
. (16)
To prevent Bob from decoding s, the spoofer should ensure
that
r(II)s < R. (17)
In this case, the rate r(II)x in (16), which equals r(α, β) in (5),
is the achievable spoofing rate.
By combining the two cases, the successful spoofing only
requires (17) to hold, since if it holds, (14) will hold automat-
ically. Note that in the above two cases, Bob cannot decode s
regardless of the decoding orders used with SIC; as a result,
it can only treat the decoded target message x as its desired
message. Also note that (17) is a strict inequality constraint.
To address this issue, we revise (17) as follows similarly as
in (4).
log2(1 + |h
√
P + gα|2) + δ2 ≤ R, (18)
where δ2 is a sufficiently small positive constant. The achiev-
able spoofing rate maximization problem is formulated as
(P2) : max
α,β
r(α, β)
s.t. (3) and (18).
B. Optimal Spoofing Solution to Problem (P2)
Similar to (P1), it can be shown that the optimality of (P2) is
attained when (6) and (7) hold. In this case, (P2) is equivalently
reformulated as
(P2.1) : max
0≤α˜≤√Q
γ˜(α˜)
s.t. χ ≤ α˜ ≤ χ, (19)
where χ = |h|
√
P−
√
2R−δ2−1
|g| and χ =
|h|
√
P+
√
2R−δ2−1
|g|
denote the minimum and maximum values of α˜ for the SIC
spoofing to be successful, respectively.
Next, we check the feasibility of problem (P2.1) (and thus
(P2)).
Lemma 4.1: Problem (P2.1) (and thus (P2)) is feasible if
and only if Q ≥ χ2.
4Proof: The feasible condition of problem (P2.1) can be
obtained by noting that α˜ ≤ √Q and χ ≤ α˜ should be satisfied
at the same time.
Finally, when problems (P2.1) and (P2) are feasible, their
optimal solutions are obtained in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1: The optimal solution to (P2.1) is given by
α¯⋆⋆ = max
(
χ, α˜1
)
, (20)
where α˜1 is the globally optimal point to maximize γ˜(α˜), as
given in (10). Then, the optimal solution to (P2) is given by
α⋆⋆ = − hg∗|h||g| α¯⋆⋆ and β⋆⋆ =
√
Q− |α⋆⋆|2.
Proof: Similar to Proposition 3.1 and based on the
monotonic property of γ˜(α˜), the optimal solution to (P2.1)
is obtained as α¯⋆⋆ in (20). Substituting it into (6) and (7), the
optimal solution to (P2) is derived. Therefore, this proposition
is proved.
It is interesting to compare the optimally designed spoofing
signals for TIN and SIC receivers at Bob, respectively. First,
it is observed from Lemmas 3.1 and 4.1 that the minimally
required spoofing power for the TIN receiver is irrespective
of the communication rate R by Alice, while that for the SIC
receiver is monotonically decreasing with respect to R. As a
result, when R is large (particularly when 2R − 1 > (1 −
1√
2
)2|h|2P by neglecting the sufficiently small δ1 and δ2),
the minimally required spoofing power for the SIC receiver
is smaller than that for the TIN receiver, and thus the SIC
Bob receiver is easier to be spoofed than the TIN one in this
case. Next, it is observed from Propositions 3.1 and 4.1 that
if α˜1 ≥ ω and α˜1 ≥ χ both hold, then the designed spoofing
signals become identical for both receivers. This happens when
the spoofing power budget Q becomes sufficiently large.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to show the
achievable spoofing rates of our proposed combined spoofing
approach with optimal spoofing signals design. We compare
our results with two benchmark schemes in the following.
• Heuristic combined spoofing with perfect source message
cancelation: The spoofer tries to cancel all the source
message by setting α = −hg∗
√
P
|g|2 , and accordingly β is
given in (7). This scheme only works when Q > |h|2P|g|2
for both TIN and SIC Bob receivers, where the minimally
required spoofing power |h|
2P
|g|2 is twice of that in Lemma
3.1 for our proposed optimal combined spoofing.
• Naive spoofing: The spoofer uses all its transmit power to
send the target message s, which corresponds to the case
with α = 0 and β =
√
Q. This scheme only applies to
the case with the TIN receiver at Bob when Q > |h|
2P
|g|2 .
In the simulation, we normalize the channel coefficients to
be h = 1 and g = 1 for the purpose of illustration, while our
results can be easily extended to the other values of h and
g. We set P = 10 dB, and R = 2 bps/Hz. Fig. 2 shows
the maximum achievable spoofing rate versus the spoofing
power Q at the spoofer. It is observed that the two benchmark
schemes achieve positive spoofing rates (or successfully spoof)
only when Q > 10 dB, while the optimal combined spoofing
does so when Q > 5 dB for the TIN receiver at Bob
and when Q is larger than 3 dB for the SIC receiver. It is
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Fig. 2. The maximum achievable spoofing rate versus the spoofing power
Q at the spoofer.
also observed that when Q is larger than 7 dB, the optimal
combined spoofing achieves the same maximum achievable
spoofing rate for both TIN and SIC receivers, and outperforms
both benchmarks schemes. The heuristic combined spoofing is
observed to achieve the same performance as the optimal one
when Q > 16 dB. This shows that in this case, it is optimal for
the spoofer to perfectly cancel the source message and then
allocate the remaining power for the target message.
VI. CONCLUSION
This letter studied the achievable spoofing rates of the
new wireless communication intervention via physical layer
spoofing, where a legitimate spoofer sends a combined version
of both the source and target messages to confuse a malicious
link from Alice to Bob. We proposed optimal spoofing sig-
nal designs when Bob employs the TIN and SIC receivers,
respectively. It is our hope that this work can provide new
insights on the fundamental information-theoretic limits of
the physical layer spoofing. How to extend the results to
general multi-antenna and multiuser scenarios is an interesting
research direction worth pursuing in the future work.
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